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8 April 1966

CUBAN SUBVERSION: SHADOW OVER LATIN AMERICA

By

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U. S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE

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Cuban Subversion: Shadow over Latin America

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SUMMARY

Latin America is currently undergoing a great social upheaval, and the resulting internal disorder, political instability, and seething discontent make it ripe for Communist exploitation. The establishment of a Communist regime in Cuba, with a dictator who is determined to spread his revolution throughout Latin America, presents a menace to the security of the United States and the entire Western Hemisphere. This thesis examines the nature and extent of the threat of Cuban subversion and the effectiveness of United States policy in countering it.

As a result of a massive program of economic and military assistance by the Soviet Union, as well as acceptance of Fidel Castro's leadership by the Moscow-oriented Communist Party leaders of Latin America, Cuba is today recognized as the headquarters and base for subversive activity throughout the Western Hemisphere. The techniques utilized include an extensive propaganda campaign; training of young Latin American Communists in subversive activities; infiltration of political, social, and economic movements within Latin American governments; and calculated acts of violence and terrorism, ranging from strikes, demonstrations, and riots to arson, bombings, kidnappings, assassinations, and executions.

At first, the attitude of the United States toward Castro was one of guarded friendship and good will. As the true nature of his activities began to manifest themselves, however, the United States began to take measures to counter the threat. Initially, there was some fumbling, evidenced in particular by the debacle of the Bay of Pigs invasion. By its firm stand in the Soviet missile crisis of October 1962 the United States regained much of its prestige and gradually has been able to muster the support of the Organization of American States in its efforts to thwart Castro's aims. United States policy today consists generally of isolating Cuba economically and politically and of strengthening the other Latin American nations, through the Alliance for Progress and internal security programs, so that they may resist Communist subversion.

The thesis analyzes the relative merits and disadvantages of alternative policies and concludes that the present policy, if pursued with firmness, patience, and understanding, will eventually result in curbing the threat of Cuban subversion and of ultimately eliminating it from the Western Hemisphere.

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

"Subversion--action designed to undermine the military, economic, psychological, morale, or political strength of a regime."¹

The purpose of this thesis is to examine the nature, methods, and extent of Cuban subversion in Latin America since the rise of Fidel Castro to power; to determine the role of the Castro regime in the current Sino-Soviet rift; to trace the evolution of the present United States policy toward this subversive effort; to analyze the results of that policy; and, if appropriate, to recommend additional or alternate measures which the United States should take to curb the rise of communism and ultimately eliminate it from the Western Hemisphere.

The interest of the author in this subject stems primarily from the curiosity aroused by allegations of Castro's complicity in numerous incidents involving subversion and violence in South and Central American countries and by the prediction of a former Commandant of the Marine Corps that Marines would be called to fight in Latin America before 1968.²

Why is this shadow over Latin America significant to us in the United States? The reasons may be divided into three broad categories.

¹US Joint Chiefs of Staff, JCS Pub. 1, p. 73.

²David M. Shoup, statement to reporters in Tokyo, New York Times, 7 Oct. 1963, p. 28.

Militarily, Latin America is important because of its geographical proximity to the continental United States, because of the strategic link between the Atlantic and the Pacific provided by the Panama Canal, and because of the strategic raw materials necessary for US defense which abound in the region.

Politically, the value of the 21 developing nations of this area, comprising over one-sixth of the total votes in the United Nations General Assembly, cannot be overlooked.³ Moreover, there is a fraternal bond with the United States due to the fact that most of the Latin American countries achieved their independence in the same way the United States did, i.e., by a successful revolution against a European monarch. Also, the United States, as the acknowledged leader of the free world, has pledged itself to help "free peoples maintain their institutions and their national integrity against aggressive movements that seek to impose upon them totalitarian regimes."⁴

Economically, private United States investment in Latin America is in the neighborhood of nine billion dollars. United States trade with Latin America amounts to nearly seven billion dollars a year, with a potential of greatly exceeding that figure in the future.⁵

³This figure does not include Cuba. It consists of the 19 Latin American members of the OAS, plus Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago, who are currently seeking admittance to the OAS. All are members of the UN, which has a current membership of 117 nations.

⁴Harry S. Truman, "Recommendations on Greece and Turkey," Department of State Bulletin, Vol. XVI, 23 Mar. 1947, p. 536.

⁵Maurice J. Mountain, "The United States and Latin America: a Political-Military Appraisal," Marine Corps Gazette, Sep. 1965, p. 19

How susceptible is Latin America to Communist subversion?

While conditions vary considerably from country to country, Latin America in general is today undergoing a great social upheaval, and the resulting internal disorder, political instability, and seething discontent present a lucrative opportunity for exploitation by Communist elements. This social revolution consists basically of demands for four different types of change.

First, there is a demand for an alteration in class relationships. Before World War I, most Latin American countries were dominated by a small landholding aristocracy, which controlled most of the income-producing resources and comprised a ruling oligarchy. The great mass of the people lived on the land in a state of semi-servitude. Recently, however, the trend toward industrialization, the growth of a worker class, and a shift of the population from rural to urban areas have given rise to demands for land reform, trade unionism, social and labor legislation, universal education, and a more equitable distribution of wealth.

Second, there has been a tendency for many countries to break away from their semi-colonial status, in which many of their principal resources were being exploited by foreign firms. This has resulted in an assertion of the national sovereignty of these countries and a clamor for return of key industries to control by their governments.

Third, there has been a demand for rapid economic development so that the citizens of these countries may enjoy an improved

standard of living. In many cases, they want to "share in the good life" without delay and are impatient with the long-range, austere programs necessary to attain economic development.

Finally, there has been a growing insistence on guarantees of the individual rights of freedom of speech, press, assembly, and belief.

This, then, is the stage upon which the drama is taking place. Now the actor who is playing the leading role will be introduced.

CHAPTER 2

BASIS OF THE THREAT

In examining the threat of Cuban subversion in Latin America, it is essential to look closely at Fidel Castro, the major figure behind the movement, particularly from the standpoint of his personality, temperament, and ambitions; his development as a Communist leader; his relationship with other Communist Party leaders in Latin America; and his special position with respect to the Sino-Soviet conflict.

CASTRO'S PERSONALITY AND ASPIRATIONS

As Latin American dictators go, Fidel Castro is unlike anyone this hemisphere has ever known. Cuba's "lider maximo" has an almost mythical ability to inspire the masses, a capacity for unconventional and imaginative thought, and a deep-seated intolerance of corruption and personal gain.¹ On the other hand, Herbert Matthews of The New York Times writes that, ". . . his is a character of such complexity, such contradictions, such emotionalism, such irrationality, such unpredictability that no one can really know him."²

By nature a dedicated and fanatical revolutionist, Castro regards himself not as the ruler of a small island, but as the leader of a great international revolution.³ His intentions with regard

¹ Foreign Policy Association, Inc., Great Decisions 1964, p. 54.

² Herbert L. Matthews, as quoted in Great Decisions 1964, p. 54.

³ Neill Macaulay, "Castro's Threat to the Hemisphere," Marine Corps Gazette, Mar. 1961, p. 20.

to Latin America, unlike some of his other policies, have been consistent. "We promise," he stated in a speech on July 26, 1960, "to continue making the nation Cuba the example that can convert the Cordillera of the Andes into the Sierra Maestra of the American continent."⁴ He considers Cuba as the base from which, not in the next five or ten years, but in the near future, the revolution will be spread by violent means over the whole of Latin America. As Ernst Halperin puts it, "Castro sees Latin America as a barrel of powder and Cuba as the flaming match which will bring this powder to the point of explosion."⁵

CASTRO AND COMMUNISM

Although there is no doubt that many of Castro's close associates, including his brother Raul and guerrilla expert Ernesto "Che" Guevara, were Communists of long standing, there has been considerable controversy as to whether Fidel was a Communist prior to taking over Cuba. In his speech in December 1961, in which he declared that he was a Marxist-Leninist, he spoke in ambiguous terms about his pro-Communist leanings before attaining power and hinted that he had not been a conscious Marxist, although communism, or something very like it, is what he had in mind for Cuba from the start.⁶

⁴Fidel Castro, as quoted in Department of State Publication 7171, Apr. 1961, p. 25.

⁵Ernst Halperin, Castro and Latin American Communism, p. 4.

⁶Fidel Castro, "Broadcast by Fidel Castro on 2 December 1961." Daily Report Supplement, Latin America, No. 31, 14 Dec. 1961, p. 39.

There are those who contend that Castro still is not what one may call an "orthodox" Communist, that because of his personality and his erratic and impulsive behavior he cannot be anything but Fidel Castro. He does not have the unswerving devotion to "the Party" that is expected of a dedicated Communist, he is apparently suspicious of the power an organized party may have, and he still rules more in the style of a caudillo than a Communist. And certainly the brand of communism that Castro has developed in Cuba makes it stand apart from the rest of the bloc. Guevara called it "communism with pachanga" (pachanga being a wild and rhythmic Afro-Cuban dance).⁷ Cuba is the only Communist country that maintains diplomatic relations with the Vatican and probably the only one where so many Communist functionaries attend church. Such Cuban-type communism is certain to be more appealing to Latin Americans than the duller Russian type.

RELATIONSHIP WITH OTHER LATIN AMERICAN COMMUNISTS

It would be incorrect to regard Castro as just another Latin American puppet of the Soviet Union. After successfully overthrowing Batista without the help of the Communists, Castro deliberately placed them in a position of power in Cuba, a move which many observers considered an abdication of control on his part. Castro confounded the experts, however, when he removed the leader of the

⁷Ernesto "Che" Guevara, as quoted in Foreign Policy Association, Inc., Great Decisions 1964, p. 56.

Cuban Communist Party, Anibal Escalante, created a new party to which the old-line, Moscow-oriented Communists were admitted, and made himself its leader. In doing so, he gained two advantages: By declaring his regime a Communist dictatorship, he committed the Soviet Union, in case of attack on Cuba by the United States, to come to his aid or risk losing considerable prestige. And as the ruler of the only Communist regime in the Western Hemisphere, he established a legitimate claim to the leadership of the Communist movement over the heads of the long-time Latin American Communist Party leaders.⁸

In his role as self-proclaimed head of the Latin American revolution, Castro called upon other revolutionary leaders to lead the masses in the struggle instead of following their strategy of cooperating with left-wing bourgeois groups and attempting to infiltrate the governmental apparatus gradually. By and large, the old-line pro-Moscow Communists, such as Vittorio Codovilla of Argentina, Luis Corvilan of Chile, and even Luis Carlos Prestes, the legendary Brazilian guerrilla fighter and revolutionary hero, rejected Castro's demands for terrorism and uprisings, feeling that they had little to gain and everything to lose by violence.⁹ Castro thereupon by-passed these old-line party bosses and proceeded to deal with radical elements and splinter groups wherever he could find them.

⁸Halperin, op. cit., p. 3.

⁹Ibid., p. 6.

POSITION IN THE SINO-SOVIET SPLIT

The relationship between Castro and the Soviet Union has been tenuous from the start. Surprised to have such a lucrative opportunity dropped in their laps, the Soviet decided to take advantage of Cuba as a stepping stone to further the Communist advance in Latin America. In February 1960 the Soviet Union signed the first of a series of aid and trade agreements with Cuba. However, it cautiously refrained from signing a formal treaty of alliance or even a nonaggression pact with Cuba, although Krushchev in several instances implied that Soviet aid would be forthcoming if Cuba were attacked by the United States.

Encouraged by the apparent United States toleration of a Communist regime on its very doorstep, the Soviet Union, in the fall of 1962, made a major blunder and embarked upon its ill-fated missile adventure. When the United States forced the withdrawal of the Soviet missiles from Cuban soil and Moscow agreed without even consulting Castro in advance, Castro was exposed as but a pawn on the East-West chessboard. The missile withdrawal also served to widen the gap in the developing Sino-Soviet rift, and Castro, his ego bruised and his faith in the Soviet Union shaken, began to move toward a neutralist position between the two disputing factions.

While the Soviet Union, Red China and Cuba differ little on their ultimate aims of undermining the economic and social progress as well as the democratic institutions and stable governments of Latin America, their short-term strategy and tactics vary somewhat.

The Chinese Communist position is clearly expressed by Lin Piao, Red China's minister of national defense, who sets forth Mao Tse-tung's theory that the world revolution consists of two revolutionary stages, the national-democratic revolution and the socialist revolution.¹⁰ The national-democratic revolution Mao sees as "a revolution against imperialism, feudalism, and bureaucrat-capitalism waged by the broad masses of the people under the leadership of the proletariat."¹¹ The socialist revolution, which presumably would result in a world-wide Communist Utopia, cannot take place, according to Mao, until completion of the national-democratic revolution. He charges that the "Krushchev revisionists" are violating the fundamental tenets of Marxism-Leninism in preaching that socialism can be built by following a general line of peaceful coexistence, peaceful transition, and peaceful competition, instead of by means of a violent revolutionary struggle.¹²

In conducting the national-democratic revolution, Mao's view is that:

the establishment of rural revolutionary base areas and the encirclement of the cities from the countryside is of outstanding and universal practical importance, . . . particularly for the revolutionary struggles of the oppressed nations and peoples in Asia, Africa, and Latin America against imperialism and its lackeys.¹³

¹⁰ Lin Piao, "Long Live the Victory of the People's War." Daily Report Supplement, Far East, No. 171 (4S), 3 Sep. 1965, p. 23.

¹¹ Ibid.

¹² Ibid., p. 24.

¹³ Ibid., p. 22.

He further contends that, from the standpoint of the entire globe, North America and Western Europe could be considered the "cities of the world," and Asia, Africa, and Latin America constitute the rural areas.

The Red Chinese, despite their emphasis on violent revolution, at present seem to be concentrating their efforts on gaining adherence of Latin American Communist parties and in establishing a presence in the Western Hemisphere. Since the only Latin American country with whom they have diplomatic relations is Cuba, they are operating under a handicap. They have set up pro-Chinese parties in Brazil, Perú, and Colombia, and there are factions in Mexico, Ecuador, Venezuela and Bolivia who share their views. They have had some success with student exchanges and mutual visits of delegations, as well as establishment of a trade presence through trade fairs and missions in various countries.¹⁴ Although the Chinese Communists expend a great deal of effort on their propaganda, it is largely ineffective, according to Ernst Halperin, because "it is too doctrinaire for the Latin Americans," who do not comprehend their "dogmatic hair-splitting" and denunciation of Soviet revisionism.¹⁵

The Soviet view is that the Chinese policy of advocating violent revolution is dangerous and reckless, and that in this nuclear age, it could escalate into a global holocaust. As to Castro's

¹⁴US Congress, House, Subcommittee on Inter-American Affairs, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Hearings, Communism in Latin America, p. 59. (referred to hereafter as "Congress, Hearings, Communism in Latin America").

¹⁵Halperin, op. cit., p. 11.

espousal of violence and guerrilla warfare, while the Soviets do not rule out revolutionary agitation or even "wars of national liberation" in certain locales and under controllable conditions, they felt initially that the strategy of peaceful infiltration by popular or national liberation fronts comprised of Communists or other leftist groups was more likely to produce results without risking a military confrontation with the United States. Russia, therefore, faced something of a dilemma in Castro since, because of geographical location, it cannot exert the same degree of control over Cuba's foreign policy that it can over its East European satellites, even though providing Cuba with massive economic and military support.

After the missile crisis of October 1962, there appeared to be a possibility that the brash and unpredictable Castro, smarting under the cavalier treatment accorded him by the Soviet Union and openly sympathetic with the Red Chinese strategy, might succumb to Peiping's courting. As Assistant Secretary of State Edwin M. Martin observed at the time, "Castro's heart seems again to have shifted to Peiping, leaving his stomach in Moscow."¹⁶ To preclude this possibility, Moscow took steps to tie Castro more closely to the Soviet camp by increasing her economic assistance to Cuba and by inviting Castro to Moscow in April-May 1963, where he was treated with great deference.

¹⁶Edwin M. Martin, "Cuba, Latin America, and Communism," Department of State Bulletin, Vol. XLIX, 14 Oct. 1963, p. 578.

Probably the most significant development with respect to the future course of subversion in Latin America was the November 1964 meeting in Havana, attended by all Latin American Communist leaders, as well as a delegation from Russia.¹⁷ The outcome of the conference was formal recognition of Cuba as the headquarters and base for training and operations affecting all Latin America and acceptance of Castro's doctrine of violent action. In return, Castro apparently agreed to acknowledge the primacy of the orthodox, Moscow-oriented parties over the splinter groups in the rest of Latin America and to concentrate revolutionary efforts on several specified countries which were considered ripe targets.

Thus, Castro has thrown his weight on the side of Moscow in the Sino-Soviet dispute. According to a veteran foreign service officer, this

period of accommodation between the two forces, with Soviet approval of more violence and Castro promises to cooperate with the established Communist parties, bodes no good for the tranquility and orderly development of Latin America along independent democratic lines.¹⁸

¹⁷ Congress, Hearings, Communism in Latin America, pp. 4-5.

¹⁸ Ralph S. Collins, "The Sino-Soviet Rift in relation to Latin America," Transition (No. 4), Jul. 1965, p. 52.

CHAPTER 3

PATTERN OF SUBVERSION

In the preceding chapters, the significance of Latin America to the United States has been examined briefly; it has been noted that, because of the profound social upheaval Latin America is presently undergoing, it is susceptible to Communist infiltration and is ripe for revolution; and it has been established that Fidel Castro, with the financial support and political encouragement of the Soviet Union, is fervently determined to use Cuba as the "springboard for subversion" to export his revolution to all of Latin America.

This chapter examines the question of how he proposes to accomplish these ambitious aims. First of all, the pattern of subversion employed by Communists in general throughout the world is reviewed. Then the extent to which Castro's specific techniques conform to this pattern is analyzed, based on an examination of some of the subversive activities which have taken place in the hemisphere since Castro attained power--activities ascribed to Castro or to those who share his views. Finally, events that have transpired in Latin America since the Havana conference of November 1964 are reviewed to see if there has been any significant shift in Communist strategy and to determine what its challenge is for the future.

The Special Consultative Committee on Security of the Organization of American States stated in its initial general report:

Communism operates on a world-wide scale. Its methods and procedures are adapted to the local conditions that will most favor its development, and they vary from simple infiltration for subversive purposes to the use of violence, according to the objective, the direction of the action, and the resistance that may be encountered.¹

PROPAGANDA

The international Communist movement considers dissemination of propaganda to be of prime importance to the success of its political action. It is carried on by groups of activists who work ceaselessly to influence the decisions and actions of governments; political parties; labor unions; farmworker's organizations; student's, women's and youth groups; intellectual, cultural, and athletic centers; centers representing racial minorities--in short, to capitalize on all legitimate national aspirations. In exploiting this technique, they make use of all known media of dissemination of information, even to the extent of abusing the prerogatives extended by countries to their diplomatic missions.²

In the propaganda arena the Cuban effort has been, and continues to be, vigorous and massive. Tons of Communist literature, featuring anti-government and "hate America" themes and ranging

¹Organization of American States, Special Consultative Committee on Security, Cuba as a Base for Subversion in America, p. 2. (referred to hereafter as "OAS, Cuba as a Base for Subversion").

²Ibid., p. 12.

from handbills and leaflets to lavishly printed four-color magazines, are printed by Imprenta Nacional, the Cuban government printing agency, and shipped to entry points throughout the region.³ The most popular Cuban book exported to Latin America appears to be the 187-page manual on guerrilla warfare written by Che Guevara, a lucidly written do-it-yourself manual on how to start with 30 to 50 men and overthrow a government. Other books being distributed clandestinely are Mao Tse-tung's Tactics of Guerrilla Fighters and General Bayo's One Hundred and Fifty Questions and Answers for Guerrillas.⁴ Much of this material has been transmitted in the past by diplomatic pouch through Cuban embassies in countries which maintained diplomatic relations with Cuba. In September 1960, for example, the Peruvian police seized thousands of leaflets, printed in Czechoslovakia, Cuba, and Red China, and consigned to the Cuban Embassy.⁵ While closure of all Cuban missions except the one in Mexico has cut down on the direct importation of such items, Cuban propaganda material still finds wide circulation through indigenous channels and direct mail.⁶

Prensa Latina, the official Cuban news agency, was overhauled by Soviet experts in 1960 and became a streamlined, Spanish-language model of Tass, the Kremlin's wire service.⁷ Like Tass, it serves

³Ibid., p. 16.

⁴Ibid.

⁵Wyatt MacGaffey and Clifford R. Barnett, Twentieth Century Cuba, p. 397.

⁶US Congress, House, Subcommittee on Inter-American Affairs, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Hearings. Communism in Latin America, p. 60. (referred to hereafter as "Congress, Hearings, Communism in Latin America").

⁷James Monahan and Kenneth O. Gilmore, The Great Deception, p. 156.

as a front for subversive activities and espionage as well as a medium for Communist propaganda. While barred from Argentina and Peru, the Prensa Latina service continues to operate legally, but with varying degrees of restriction, in seven countries: Bolivia, Chile, Costa Rica, Honduras, Mexico, Panama, and Uruguay.⁸ It has never been much of a success, as its free handouts have been rejected for the most part by the Latin American press and radio except for Communist and Castroite newspapers.⁹

The principal direct and mass audience medium in Cuba to carry subversive propaganda to Latin America is shortwave radio. Radio Havana, inaugurated in May 1961, is a \$35 million installation of Swiss and Czech equipment with five 100,000-watt transmitters, the most powerful in Latin America.¹⁰ The message of communism is being transmitted to Latin America at the rate of 155 hours a week in Spanish, Portuguese, and English, as well as Quechua, for the Indian populations of Bolivia, Peru, Ecuador, and Argentina; Guarani, for the Indians in Paraguay; and Aymara, the language of the descendants of the Incas.¹¹ Time is regularly allotted to groups of foreign nationals residing in Cuba, such as the Peruvian Anti-Imperialist Struggle Movement, the Nicaraguan Unity Front, the Dominican Liberation Movement, the Honduran Liberation Movement,

⁸US Congress, House Subcommittee on Inter-American Affairs, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Report, Communism in Latin America, p. 7. (referred to hereafter as "Congress, Report, Communism in Latin America").

⁹David D. Burks, Cuba and Castro, p. 42.

¹⁰Monahan and Gilmore, op. cit., p. 178.

¹¹Congress, Report, Communism in Latin America, p. 7.

and the Guatemalan Information Committee, primarily for the purpose of inciting their listeners to violence.¹² In addition, Cuban government broadcasts have made scurrilous denunciations of many duly elected leaders of the American states, calling President Lopez Mateos "the betrayer of the Mexican Revolution," President Alessandri "the corrupter of the faith of the Chilean people," President Lleras Camargo of Colombia "the intimate friend of exploiting imperialism" and so on. Furthermore, they have denounced the Organization of American States as a "lie," a "capitalist conspiracy," and the United States' "Ministry of Colonies."¹³

Another instrument for spreading Cuban propaganda is the medium of motion pictures and television, usually in the form of film stories and documentaries on the Cuban revolution and clearly intended to exploit the image of Cuba and deceive gullible viewers.¹⁴

RECRUITMENT AND TRAINING

According to the OAS's Special Consultative Committee on Security,

Communism, through an appropriate system of selection, chooses the most capable individuals for the ends it seeks. Then, in schools or training centers, these individuals are prepared as activists of all kinds: leaders, orators, and propagandists; experts in sabotage, espionage, and terrorism in all its forms; specialists in the handling of arms and radio equipment, in guerrilla warfare, etc.¹⁵

¹²Monahan and Gilmore, op. cit., pp. 178-179.

¹³MacGaffey and Barnett, op. cit., p. 396.

¹⁴OAS, Cuba as a Base for Subversion, p. 16.

¹⁵Ibid., p. 4.

Possibly the greatest potential danger to the Western Hemisphere lies in Cuba's role as the major training ground for Communist guerrillas and subversive agents in Latin America. Candidates from all over Latin America, ranging in age from 17 to 30, are handpicked after careful background investigations by veteran Communists. They arrive on flights from Moscow, Prague, and Mexico City, on ships carrying goods to Castro, or in small boats from Central America. Their number runs as high as 1500 at any given time, and it has been estimated that over 5000 of them have been trained to date.¹⁶ Recent travel restrictions are believed to have reduced the number receiving such training, but this belief admittedly is conjecture.¹⁷

Overall supervision of the schools is exercised by the General Directorate of Intelligence (DGI), a highly professional espionage and subversion agency.¹⁸ At least nine guerrilla training centers were operating in Cuba as of 1963,¹⁹ and, according to one source, this number has since increased to 30.²⁰ As an example of their curriculum, in the "practical" guerrilla warfare school at Minas del Frio, in the Sierra Maestra, instruction is given in sabotage, terrorism, military tactics, living off the

¹⁶"Castro's Cuba: A US Problem Becomes a Threat to the World," US News and World Report, 10 Feb. 1964, p. 51.

¹⁷Congress, Hearings, Communism in Latin America, p. 4.

¹⁸Ibid., p. 120.

¹⁹OAS, Cuba as a Base for Subversion, p. 7.

²⁰Thomas J. Dodd, "Vietnam and Latin America," Congressional Record, Vol. 111, No. 160, 31 Aug. 1965, p. 21521.

land while hiding out, use and home manufacture of light weapons, and handling of explosives. Students are given case studies in specific areas and learn which points to attack first, how to mobilize the discontented peasants, and how and when to use terrorist tactics.²¹ Other schools teach Marxism, propaganda techniques, infiltration of political groups, and the like. Evidence indicates that personnel from many Latin American countries, particularly from Venezuela, Colombia, and Panama, have attended these schools and, upon return to their homelands, have applied their knowledge in furtherance of the Communist cause or have provided training for others. Especially promising graduates are sometimes whisked off to Moscow for advanced courses in subversion.²²

INFILTRATION

Another basic tactic of the world Communist movement is infiltration of political, social, and economic movements within a government to take advantage of those indigenous nationalist and ultra-leftist groups which are sources of agitation to the government.²³

Again, this is an area in which Fidel Castro has been extremely active. In many countries, Castroites have taken over labor unions, peasant organizations, and student, intellectual, and artistic groups. The Venezuelan Communist Party has been urging a number of

²¹"Castro's Cuba: A US Problem Becomes a Threat to the World," US News and World Report, 10 Feb. 1964, p. 51.

²²Ibid., p. 53.

²³OAS, Cuba as a Base for Subversion, p. 5.

leftist-extremist groups to form a National Liberation Front to serve as "a political umbrella" for the Armed Forces of National Liberation (FALN), which is backed by Castro.²⁴ There are increasing reports of Cuban cooperation with perennial anti-government malcontents in Panama.²⁵ In Argentina, according to one report, Castro has even enlisted the support of some of the followers of ex-dictator Juan Peron.²⁶ In the wake of the landing of US troops in the Dominican Republic, some rebels of the "14th of June" Castroite party have moved to control labor unions and student movements and to occupy government positions. Although few in number, they have managed to occupy key positions which enable them to exercise a degree of control far out of proportion to their relatively weak numerical strength. In Colombia, Castro supporters have taken over existing bandit gangs, supplied them with Cuban-trained leaders, Castro-style uniforms, and Communist ideology.²⁷

CALCULATED VIOLENCE

While Moscow's strategy is generally one of favoring peaceful infiltration, as we have noted in Chapter 2, the Russians are not opposed to violence providing it can be reasonably well controlled and runs little risk of escalation into global war.

²⁴ Congress, Hearings, Communism in Latin America, p. 121.

²⁵ Ibid., p. 122.

²⁶ Neill Macaulay, "Castro's Threat to the Hemisphere," Marine Corps Gazette, Mar. 1961, p. 22.

²⁷ "Where Castro Brews New Trouble for US," US News and World Report, 18 Oct. 1965, p. 40.

The extent of violence instigated by Castro or by Communists supported by him or sharing his views is almost incredible. These activities run the gamut from strikes, demonstrations and riots to arson, bombings, kidnappings, assassinations, and executions. The most violent forms, besides spreading terror throughout the populace, serve the additional purpose of immobilizing large numbers of local police and military forces. Here are just a few examples from what one writer refers to as "an appalling scoreboard" of Communist violence in Latin America:²⁸

In the outbreaks of rioting in Panama in January 1964, in which four US soldiers were killed and a great deal of US property destroyed, some 200 to 300 Panamanians who had gotten their subversive schooling in Cuba played a vital part. US officials are convinced that the riots would have been short-lived if Castro's agents had not been there to organize the turmoil and keep it from dying down.²⁹

Early in 1964, Communists in Guatemala formed the Revolutionary Armed Force (FAR), which is supported by Castro and by Guatemalan exiles in Mexico. This organization consists of some 300 guerrillas, led by Marco Antonio Yon Sosa, a former army lieutenant who attended the US Army's counterinsurgency school in Panama. It has reportedly received some \$200,000 from Cuba's

²⁸Kenneth O. Gilmore, "Cuba's Brazen Blueprint for Subversion," Reader's Digest, Aug. 1965, p. 74.

²⁹"Castro's Cuba: A US Problem Becomes a Threat to the World," US News and World Report, 10 Feb. 1964, p. 53.

General Directorate of Intelligence, has been conducting hit-and-run raids from the mountains along the Honduran border, and has been involved in bombings in several cities. In February 1965, these terrorists ambushed an army convoy, killing fifteen soldiers; threw grenades during a parade in the capital, killing or wounding ten soldiers; and burned a garage rented by the US aid mission in Guatemala City, gutting 23 vehicles.³⁰

In Peru, several guerrilla groups have been robbing businessmen and raiding military posts for weapons and supplies. They live off the land and force cooperation from the local Indians with blandishments and threats. They use terrorist tactics to tame the populace when necessary, and recently executed four Indians who had informed the government of their whereabouts.³¹

In Colombia, a notorious "bandit-turned-Castroite," Pedro Antonio Marin, leads some 160 guerrillas, and is the main suspect in the kidnapping of a leading industrialist whose body was found in the mountains. His band killed 17 people--including two nuns--in a raid last year. Elsewhere in Colombia, a band of uniformed National Liberation Army guerrillas last year raided a village, killed three policemen, robbed a bank, and ambushed an army patrol. In the northeast, guerrilla bands have been terrifying the populace by shooting, looting, and haranguing them to join in a

³⁰Congress, Hearings, Communism in Latin America, p. 122.

³¹"Where Castro Brews New Trouble for US," US News and World Report, 18 Oct. 1965, p. 40.

people's revolt. Total guerrilla forces in Colombia, according to one report, may be as high as 1000, of whom some 300 were trained in Cuba.³²

In Venezuela, having failed to overthrow President Betancourt's government in 1963 or to disrupt the election of his successor, the Communist terrorists (FALN) have shifted their emphasis from urban to rural targets. Some 400 of these Communists have received guerrilla training in Cuba and have, in turn, trained several thousand peasants and students. Operating from the hills in seven states, they are engaged in Castro-style activities to murder local authorities and win over the peasantry.³³ In a typical raid, they descended on the village of Uquide last October, occupied it for several hours, stole money and vehicles, kidnapped a police official, and faded into the mountains as government troops arrived. Also, there have been several recent incidents of urban terrorist raids, dynamiting of oil-company pipelines, and blowing up of powerline towers, efforts which tend to hamper economic progress in Venezuela.³⁴

With respect to the provision of arms by Cuba to revolutionary groups in Latin America, a Congressional subcommittee stated in its report,

The 3-ton Cuban arms cache found in Venezuela in November 1963 clearly demonstrates Havana's capability for delivering

³²"New Strategy," Time, 23 Apr. 1965, p. 40.

³³Ibid.

³⁴"Where Castro Brews New Trouble for US," US News and World Report, 18 Oct. 1965, p. 39.

material support to Latin American groups. However, the kind of arms used in small-scale guerrilla warfare operations in Latin America can be readily obtained in most countries with funds provided by Cuba or other Communist sources. Havana now generally prefers to provide the money for arms purchases rather than the arms themselves.³⁵

The same report states that the Cuban DGI gave more than \$1 million to Venezuelan guerrilla activists during the period 1960-1964 and in 1963 gave \$250,000 to Guatemalan revolutionary groups, about \$50,000 to revolutionary groups in El Salvador, and \$30,000 to a pro-Castro political group in Panama.³⁶ And the OAS Special Consultative Committee on Security states,

It can be affirmed that it is the present Cuban Government that is responsible for providing, directly or indirectly, a large portion of the financial support received by the Communist Parties.³⁷

EVENTS SINCE THE HAVANA CONFERENCE OF NOVEMBER 1964

One of the outcomes of the Havana conference of November 1964 was agreement by the various Communist Parties of Latin America to become more energetic in support of the Cuban regime. Some evidence exists that efforts are now underway to implement this agreement. Specifically, the Guatemalan Communist Party appears to have abandoned its peaceful revolutionary policy and is now working hand-in-glove with Yon Sosa's Cuban-supported guerrillas. The

³⁵Congress, Hearings, Communism in Latin America, p. 121.

³⁶Ibid., p. 120.

³⁷OAS, Cuba as a Base for Subversion, p. 19.

Uruguayan Communists have formed a Latin American "solidarity with Cuba" movement. Former Brazilian President Goulart's extremist brother-in-law, Leonel Brizola, reportedly is setting up a coordinating committee in Montevideo to "facilitate the flow of Brazilian trainees and money to and from Cuba." Argentine and Chilean Communists, in a joint communique on 31 January 1965, called for restoration of diplomatic, trade, and cultural relations and for increased solidarity with "heroic Cuba," as well as a "campaign of solidarity" with the Venezuelan Communist Party. Finally, Havana is considering a "Latin American guerrilla movement," to include guerrilla groups from Colombia, Guatemala, Peru and Bolivia.³⁸

In the Pravda communique on the November 1964 Havana conference, the main targets for action specifically mentioned were Venezuela, Colombia, Guatemala, Honduras, Panama, Paraguay, and Haiti.³⁹ Today, Cuba seems to be focusing its subversive efforts largely on three countries--Venezuela, Colombia and Guatemala--and concentrating only on targets of opportunity in the other Latin American countries.⁴⁰

At this point it would be well to mention some rather conflicting testimony given a Senate committee by a specialist on Latin America, Stanley Ross. He stated that Che Guevara, Cuba's

³⁸Congress, Hearings, Communism in Latin America, p. 121.

³⁹Ibid., p. 5.

⁴⁰Ibid., p. 44.

missing ex-Minister of Economy, has been travelling incognito throughout Latin America in late 1965, organizing a congress of Communist guerrillas under Chinese-Cuban direction in Havana.⁴¹ As a result of this congress, scheduled for early 1966, he predicted that numerous revolutions would break out all at once in Latin America, and "the Chinese Communists will then, through intermediaries, say their price for peace in Latin America will be that the United States get out of Vietnam."⁴² He said also that, at the time of the Dominican Republic revolt, Che Guevara and the Chinese Communists had arranged for simultaneous revolutions in Guatemala, Venezuela, Colombia, Peru, Bolivia and Haiti.⁴³

In analyzing the authenticity of Mr. Ross's testimony and the accuracy of his predictions, it is significant to note, first of all, that a Tri-Continental Solidarity Conference of Asian, African and Latin American revolutionaries was indeed held in Havana in January 1966 and that a Red Chinese delegation attended. And in a speech on January 15, 1966, Fidel Castro touched off speculation by hinting that "a few revolutionaries" know what Guevara is up to and "the imperialists are, of course, interested in learning all the details."⁴⁴ In the same speech he chided some revolutionaries for not being militant enough and suggested that if a number of

⁴¹US Congress, Senate, Committee on the Judiciary, Subcommittee to Investigate the Administration of the Internal Security Act and Other Internal Security Laws, Red Chinese Infiltration into Latin America, 4 Aug. 1965, p. 23.

⁴²Ibid., p. 31.

⁴³Ibid., p. 29.

⁴⁴Fidel Castro, "Text of Fidel Castro Speech to Closing Session," Daily Report, Latin America, 17 Jan. 1966, p. aaaa 18.

Latin American countries engage in "a joint, simultaneous struggle . . . then the hour of liberation for this continent will be advanced."⁴⁵

By themselves, the events and statements mentioned above seem to lend credence to Mr. Ross's testimony. However, in the past few weeks since the close of the Havana conference, Communist China and Cuba became involved in a bitter dispute over Red China's reduction of rice exports to Cuba, and on February 6, 1966, Castro leveled a withering, vehement blast at Red China for attempting to subvert the Cuban army and for imposing "brutal reprisals of an economic nature for purely political reasons."⁴⁶

While Castro's February 6 speech may have been a deliberate effort to camouflage the joint Chinese-Cuban venture that Mr. Ross mentions, it is considered to be most unlikely, in view of the dominant influence of Russia over Cuba at the present time, the bitterness of the Sino-Soviet dispute, and the absence of significant Red Chinese activity of any such magnitude in Latin America. Rather, it is considered that Castro's latest speech gives evidence to the world, more clearly than ever before, of the extent to which the Soviet-Cuban entente has progressed.

Nevertheless, although conditions in Latin America do not appear to favor simultaneous revolutions at the present time, the

⁴⁵Ibid., p. aaaa 16.

⁴⁶Michael Arkus, "Castro Hits Peking for 'Subversion,'" Washington Post, 7 Feb. 1966, p. 1.

possibility that such a situation might occur in the future constitutes a potential peril to the security of the United States which should merit serious consideration by US political and military planners.

CHAPTER 4

UNITED STATES ACTIONS AND POLICY RELATING TO CUBAN SUBVERSION

In Chapter 3 the methods by which Fidel Castro hopes to attain his goals and the extent of his activities to date have been analyzed. An obvious question which now arises is: What is the United States, as the guardian of the Western Hemisphere, doing to thwart his aims? Or, more specifically, now that Castro appears to be irretrievably committed to his course, what policy have we adopted to counter Cuban subversion in Latin America, how was this policy evolved, and what actions is the United States taking, either individually or in concert with its Latin American neighbors, to implement it? The answers to these questions, though extensive and complicated, are summarized briefly in this chapter.

When Fidel Castro overthrew the Batista dictatorship on January 1, 1959, the Western Hemisphere as a whole generally welcomed the new regime and looked forward hopefully to its promises of freedom and social reform for the Cuban people. Recognition of the new government by Washington followed almost immediately, although some officials had uneasy premonitions that the new leader might be difficult to deal with because of his stated intentions to institute drastic changes. Added to these forebodings was the widespread revulsion in the United States over the circus-like courts martial and ruthless executions of Batista henchmen by the

new regime.¹ Nevertheless, when Castro visited the United States in April 1959, he was greeted by top government officials in Washington, offered financial assistance to get his government on its feet, and generally given a warm welcome.² In return, Castro professed good will toward the United States.

In light of his subsequent actions, it appears that Castro's protestations of friendship for the United States were far from genuine. For one thing, as an extreme nationalist, he blamed the United States, with some justification, for being responsible for many of Cuba's ills during the sixty years in which she had been virtually an economic colony of the United States. He harbored some resentment over the fact that the United States had, as he alleged, supported Batista against him and had refused to grant his forces belligerent status. No doubt the continuation of the United States arms embargo against him after the fall of Batista also irritated him. Finally, the critical and derogatory accounts in the US press about his war crimes trials and his personal idiosyncrasies, as well as ominous threats by several US Congressmen, must surely have infuriated him. At any rate, as early as May 1960, he and several of his closest advisors took part in unreasonable and vehement verbal attacks on the United States.³

There followed in 1959 and early 1960 a steady deterioration in United States-Cuban relations, provoked by a number of incidents,

¹David D. Burks, Cuba under Castro, pp. 50-51.

²Foreign Policy Association, Inc., Great Decisions 1964, p. 50.

³Burks, op. cit., pp. 51-52.

including the following:

- granting of asylum by the United States to Cuban exiles from Castro's government and giving them a platform to air their grievances;
- illegal airplane flights by Cuban exiles to supply arms to their friends in Cuba;
- the rejection of proffered US financial aid by Castro because of the unacceptable strings attached;
- the sale of Cuban sugar to Russia in August 1959;
- the growth of Communist influence in Cuba and statements by the Russians that they were ready to support Cuba against US invasion;
- , - the seizure of American oil companies who refused to process Soviet crude oil;
- an increase in severity of the diatribe against the United States.⁴

In July 1960, after a long period of forbearance, the United States quota on Cuban sugar imports, which gave the United States tremendous power over Cuba and was, "in a way, a hostage for Castro's good behavior," was reduced by President Eisenhower.⁵ According to one observer, the United States was "putting Castro through the wringer."⁶ Castro promptly countered by expropriating

⁴Ibid., pp. 52-55.

⁵Ibid., p. 54.

⁶William A. Williams, The United States, Cuba, and Castro, p. 109.

without compensation almost \$1 billion worth of United States property in Cuba. A short time later, the United States eliminated its sugar quota entirely, and followed this action by banning all exports to Cuba except medical supplies and food. One view of this series of events is that,

by giving up on Castro and becoming increasingly negative and antagonistic, the United States closed off the one main chance Castro had to make his Revolution without turning to the Communists in Cuba and to the Soviet Union.⁷

A more credible view, however, is expressed by R. Hart Phillips, a correspondent for the New York Times, who wrote:

The U.S. did not, as many claim even yet, push Castro into the arms of the Communist countries. It was one and one-half years before the U.S. took any action against Castro, despite the fact that Americans had been imprisoned without cause, American-owned property confiscated, the U.S. accused of all types of aggression, commerce practically cut off between Cuba and the U.S., a vicious campaign carried on against the U.S. in Latin America and armed expeditions sent out from Cuba to attempt to overthrow other governments in Latin America.⁸

By mid-1960, it may be concluded, the possibility of a reasonable negotiation between the United States and Castro was highly unlikely; the die was cast, and Castro had apparently decided that his fortunes lay in establishing close ties with the Soviet Union.

Perturbed by Castro's open avowal of friendship with the Soviet Union and the resultant danger to the security of the

⁷ Ibid., p. 120.

⁸ R. Hart Phillips, as quoted in Foreign Policy Association, Inc., Great Decisions 1964, p. 50.

American states, the United States sought to enlist full hemispheric support against the threat. In August 1960, at the Seventh Consultative Meeting of Foreign Ministers in San Jose, Costa Rica, Secretary of State Christian Herter asked that the American states "indicate grave concern over Cuba's toleration and encouragement" of Communist intervention in the hemisphere.⁹ During the ensuing discussions, eight countries came to the defense of Cuba, basically on the grounds that the proposal constituted intervention, "the great bugbear."¹⁰ At this time, according to one expert, "Rightly or wrongly, Cuba had . . . become a symbol throughout the hemisphere of the efforts of a small country to throw off the economic imperialism and political tutelage of a large neighbor."¹¹ The best that the United States could do was to obtain a generally worded resolution, the Declaration of San Jose, which condemned extracontinental intervention as jeopardizing American solidarity and security and rejecting "the attempt of the Sino-Soviet powers to exploit the political, economic, or social situation of any American State."¹²

A few weeks later, in another diplomatic venture, the United States adopted a different tack in its efforts to stem the rising tide of communism, this time by aiming a blow at the social

⁹Christian Herter, as quoted by George Wythe, The United States and Inter-American Relations, p. 45.

¹⁰George Wythe, The United States and Inter-American Relations, p. 46.

¹¹Ibid., p. 50.

¹²Pan American Union, Final Act, Seventh Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs, p. 5.

dissension upon which communism nourishes. The result was the proclaiming of the Act of Bogota, an agreement by Latin American nations, Cuba excepted, to act in solving social and economic problems, with financial help in the initial amount of \$500 million provided by the United States under its newly-enacted Public Law 735.¹³

Early in January 1961 the impetuous Castro heaped yet another indignity upon the United States by arrogantly demanding a reduction in the strength of the US Embassy in Havana from 87 persons to 11.¹⁴ This step proved to be the "straw that broke the camel's back," and President Eisenhower, nearing the end of his term of office, responded by severing diplomatic relations with Cuba.

The advent of the Kennedy Administration brought new energies to bear on the existing problems posed by Cuba, as well as some fresh innovations, one of which was the establishment on March 1, 1961, of the Peace Corps. This program was initially focused on Africa, but by the end of 1962 emphasis had shifted to Latin America, where there were 1,100 volunteers in 13 countries. Initially viewed with some skepticism, the program gradually won acceptance by local communities, due in part to the high caliber of the corpsmen and their lack of conspicuous prosperity.¹⁵

A more significant development, however, was the proposal by President Kennedy on March 13, 1961, for a new name and a

¹³Milton S. Eisenhower, "The Alliance for Progress: Historic Roots" in The Alliance for Progress, edited by John C. Dreier, p. 14.

¹⁴Temple Wanamaker, American Foreign Policy Today, p. 220.

¹⁵Wythe, op. cit., p. 160.

broader coverage for the joint attack on Latin American economic underdevelopment. Since World War II there had been deep resentment and vexation throughout Latin America over the failure to include the Western Hemisphere in the provision of mass grants and liberal loans under the Marshall Plan.¹⁶ The Alliance for Progress is an attempt to correct this disparity. Although patterned after the Marshall Plan, one important difference is that most of the financial resources are in the form of long-term, no-interest credits and private investment. Another is that each country must submit a national development plan to the institutions extending the financial and technical assistance under the program.¹⁷ In brief, the objectives of the Alliance are, through self-help measures, to narrow the gap between living standards of Latin American countries and developed countries by providing for a growth in national income per capita of not less than 2.5% annually; to achieve a more equitable distribution of income within each country; to accelerate industrialization and raise agricultural productivity while achieving balanced diversification; to eliminate adult illiteracy; to provide for comprehensive agrarian reform; and to implement far-reaching measures for improvements in health, housing, and price stability.¹⁸

¹⁶Ibid., p. 154.

¹⁷Ibid., p. 222.

¹⁸"Title I: Objectives of the Alliance for Progress, Charter of Punta del Este," Department of State Bulletin, Vol. XLV, 11 Sep. 1961, pp. 463-464.

To finance this vast program, the United States pledged itself to provide a major part of the \$20 billion minimum required for the program over the ten-year period visualized, with about one-fourth of the amount coming from European and Japanese sources.¹⁹ However, as Secretary Rusk has pointed out, the contribution of the United States amounts to about two percent of the gross national product of the other countries of the Alliance, while "98% is their responsibility and their contribution."²⁰

Reactions to this ambitious undertaking were mixed. Some cynics in Latin America interpreted it as much a "response to fear of Castroism as to a desire to help Latin America,"²¹ and "just another United States aid program."²² Others accepted it as a genuine attempt to meet the needs of the hemisphere. In August 1961, the Alliance was established by the Charter of Punta del Este and approved by all of the American republics except Cuba.²³

Initially, progress under the Alliance was slow, but it began to pick up impetus as the participants entered into the spirit of the program. Some criticism of the program vanished with the establishment in 1963 of the Inter-American Committee on

¹⁹ Wythe, op. cit., pp. 222-223.

²⁰ US Dept of State, Latin America, Publication 7545, May 1963, p. 1.

²¹ Burks, op. cit., p. 55.

²² Teodoro Moscoso, as quoted in US Policy in Latin America, edited by Grant S. McClellan, p. 222.

²³ Wanamaker, op. cit., p. 215.

the Alliance for Progress, or CIAP, a multinational organization which has the task of coordinating and directing for the OAS all the numerous and diverse development activities going on under the Alliance.²⁴ Although criticism of the program exists today, and inevitably will continue to exist, its achievements after nearly five years of effort are a matter of public record, of which the United States and the OAS can be justifiably proud. Though the program is due to expire in 1971, under the original agreement, President Johnson has informed the OAS "that the United States will be prepared to extend mutual commitments beyond the time period foreseen in the charter of Punta del Este."²⁵

One of the items of unfinished business passed on to the Kennedy Administration was the scheme for an invasion of Cuba by a group of Cuban exiles who had been trained, armed, and directed under the aegis of the US Central Intelligence Agency. The failure of the invasion at the Bay of Pigs, on April 17, 1961, due to serious military and political errors and resulting in the slaughter or capture of nearly 1,800 Cuban exiles, caused what was probably the greatest loss of prestige in United States history. The hue and outcries ranged from condemnation of the United States for intervention and deceit to ridicule of her vacillation and

²⁴US Department of State, "The Alliance for Progress," Foreign Affairs Outline, (No. 7), Jun. 1964, p. 6.

²⁵Lyndon B. Johnson, "US Prepared to Extend the Alliance for Progress," Department of State Bulletin, Vol. LIII, 20 Dec. 1965, p. 987.

ineptitude. Castro's position, on the other hand, was considerably strengthened, both within his own country and in Latin America.

The next significant action against Cuba was provoked by Castro's announcement in December 1961 that he was a Marxist-Leninist.²⁶ Concerned over the threat posed by this announcement, the Council of the OAS called for a meeting of foreign ministers at Punta del Este, Uruguay, in January 1962.²⁷ The United States went into this session with a proposal for tough sanctions against Cuba, but when a number of Latin American nations would not support such strong action, the United States had to settle for a resolution expelling Cuba from hemispheric cooperation in the OAS. Cuba, of course, voted against this resolution, and six nations, representing well over half the population and area of Latin America, abstained.²⁸ Close as the vote was, the resolution was of great importance in bringing about the present political and economic isolation of Cuba. A further result of the meeting, also, was that the Council of the OAS was charged by the ministers with maintaining vigilance and with warning against Communist aggression and subversion in the hemisphere and was urged to cooperate in achieving a greater individual and collective capacity to counteract these threats. A special consultative committee was

²⁶Fidel Castro, "Broadcast by Fidel Castro on 2 December 1961, Daily Report Supplement, Latin America, 14 Dec. 1961, p. 39.

²⁷Wythe, op. cit., p. 51.

²⁸Burks, op. cit., p. 56.

formed for this purpose and has been helpful in acquainting the member nations of the nature of the threat.²⁹

The missile crisis in October 1962, in addition to being the turning point of the East-West conflict, served in large measure to restore the prestige of the United States in Latin America. The Council of the OAS, acting in a special session on 23 October 1962, gave evidence of their strong support of the US action by unanimously calling for the withdrawal of all offensive weapons from Cuba and recommending the use of force, if necessary, to prevent the further introduction into Cuba of Sino-Soviet materiel considered detrimental to the security of the Western Hemisphere. Further, the OAS directed the conduct of an urgent study of the transfer of funds to American republics for subversive purposes, the flow of subversive propaganda, and the utilization of Cuba as a base for training in subversive techniques.³⁰

In a meeting in Vienna in June 1961, Premier Krushchev told President Kennedy that ". . . wars of liberation supported by the Kremlin would replace the old methods of direct aggression and invasion."³¹ President Kennedy concluded that,

Now we face a new and different threat. We no longer have a nuclear monopoly. Their missiles

²⁹US Congress, House, Subcommittee on Inter-American Affairs, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Hearings, Communism in Latin America, p. 34. (Referred to hereafter as "Congress, Hearings, Communism in Latin America.")

³⁰Organization of American States, Special Consultative Committee on Security, Cuba as a Base for Subversion in America, p.1. (Referred to hereafter as "OAS, Cuba as a Base for Subversion.")

³¹John F. Kennedy, "Report to the American People," Department of State Bulletin, Vol. XLIV, 26 Jun. 1961, p. 994.

they believe, will hold off our missiles, and their troops can match our troops should we intervene in the so-called wars of liberation. Thus, the local conflicts they support can turn in their favor through guerrillas, or insurgents, or subversion. . . .³²

In discussing this new challenge, President Kennedy's advisers reached the conclusion that victory could come only by coordinating the political, economic, and psychological efforts, as well as military means, of the US government at the highest level in Washington, and by using close-working interdepartmental country teams overseas.³³ At the President's direction a doctrine was developed which provided the responsible agencies with policy guidance for the proper employment of US strength, including political, economic, psychological, military, and paramilitary resources to work with friendly and willing local governments to prevent the start of subversive (Communist-inspired) insurgency or defeat it once it had taken a violent form.³⁴

Central direction of this effort overseas was placed in the hands of the US ambassador in each country.

"United States internal security programs," a State Department official has stated, "are only undertaken at the request of the Latin American governments and can only be a modest addition to their own efforts."³⁵ Such programs are underway at the present

³²Ibid.

³³Richard H. Sanger, "The Age of Insurgency," Transition (No. 4), Jul. 1965, p. 73.

³⁴Ibid., p. 74.

³⁵Edwin M. Martin, "Communist Subversion in the Western Hemisphere," Foreign Affairs Outlines, Mar. 1963, No. 2, p. 13.

in 18 Latin America countries.³⁶ In essence, they start with an intensive, coordinated analysis of each country's capability to maintain internal law and order against Communist-inspired violence. Where determined necessary, the United States promptly provides, under its military assistance and public safety programs, appropriate materiel and training for control of Communist-inspired civil disturbances, for vigilance and control of movements of subversives and arms inside the country and across its borders, and for observation and patrol of rural areas for detection and dispersion of guerrilla movements. In addition to instruction in the country by US military advisers and mobile training teams, training is given at Fort Gulick, Canal Zone, and at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, to carefully chosen Latin American military officers and NCO's in such subjects as riot control, counterinsurgency, intelligence, counterintelligence, public information, and psychological warfare. Selected Latin American civil police are given training in organization, administration, riot control, records, and investigations at the Inter-American Police Academy in the Canal Zone, established in 1962 by the Agency for International Development as a part of its public safety program. Finally, the United States has encouraged civic action, or nation building, programs designed to improve social and economic development as

³⁶US Congress, House, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Hearings, Foreign Assistance Act of 1965, p. 630.

well as to establish a better rapport between the military and police forces and the civil populace.³⁷ Care must be exercised in civic action programs, however, lest they create resentment on the part of civil officials over the intrusion of soldiers into their domains or result in entrenchment of military personnel in communities to the extent that the democratic process is jeopardized. Other considerations are that soldiers may lack the necessary technical competence for civic action roles and that troop dispositions for civic action may not be compatible with those required for national security, the raison d'etre for military forces.³⁸

Another step in increasing the collective defense efforts of the Organization of the American States was taken when, as a result of the discovery of a three-ton cache of Castro-furnished arms on her northern coast and the subsequent uncovering of a fantastic FALN plot for an attack on Caracas, Venezuela charged that Cuba had committed an act of aggression against her.³⁹ An investigative committee verified the charge and on July 26, 1964, the OAS, in its strongest action to date, formally signed resolutions branding Cuba as an aggressor, urging strengthening of hemispheric defenses against Cuban subversion, and calling for sanctions against Cuba, including a break in diplomatic ties and the suspension of maritime

³⁷ Sanger, op. cit., p. 74.

³⁸ Lyle N. McAllister, "Changing Concepts of the Role of the Military in Latin America," The Annals, Jul. 1965, p. 94.

³⁹ Kenneth O. Gilmore, "Cuba's Brazen Blueprint for Subversion," Reader's Digest, Aug. 1965, pp. 67-72.

transport and trade, except for medical supplies and foodstuffs.⁴⁰

Today, only Mexico maintains diplomatic relations with Cuba, a fact which has the advantage of furnishing a "window on Cuba."

An additional important event in the long struggle against communism in the Western Hemisphere took place on April 28, 1965, when President Johnson, at the request of the government of the Dominican Republic, landed Marines at Santo Domingo for the protection and evacuation of American civilians. On April 29, 1965, on learning that Communist elements were involved in the disorder to the extent that they represented a peril to the country's freedom, President Johnson ordered the landing of additional troops. This action, Secretary Mann points out, prevented a bloodbath and widening of the civil war, helped to stabilize the countryside, and opened the way for a political settlement under the auspices of the OAS.⁴¹ On May 1, 1965, the OAS Ministers of Foreign Affairs adopted a resolution to send a committee to Santo Domingo to assist in obtaining a cease-fire and to observe the situation first-hand.⁴² They followed this on May 6, 1965, by a resolution to create an Inter-American Force and send it to the Dominican Republic to maintain order pending political settlement.⁴³

⁴⁰ Ibid., p. 73.

⁴¹ Thomas C. Mann, "The Dominican Crisis: Correcting Some Misconceptions," Department of State Bulletin, Vol. LIII, 8 Nov. 1965, p. 735.

⁴² Organization of American States, Special Consultative Committee on Security, Combined Reports on Communist Subversion, p. 107.

⁴³ Leonard C. Meeker, "The Dominican Situation in the Perspective of International Law," Department of State Bulletin, Vol. LIII, 12 Jul. 1965, p. 63.

President Johnson has been criticized in some circles for his precipitate action in sending troops without prior OAS sanction, and there have been the time-worn charges of intervention as well. It is believed, however, that such charges are unwarranted. The President responded only to an admission by the local government that the situation was out of control and American lives were in danger. Once the troops were ashore and the real situation concerning Communist complicity became apparent, the President served notice to Communists throughout the world that we were willing and able to back up with military force our oft-stated concern over Communist subversion. And when the OAS took collective action appropriate to the situation, he promptly withdrew part of our military force and made the remainder available to the OAS.

As a result of the Dominican Republic situation, and the relatively slow speed and difficulty of bringing collective action to bear, President Johnson and Secretary Rusk reportedly were in favor of establishing an Inter-American Peace Force, composed of military units from a number of Latin American nations, to be organized on a permanent basis for the purpose of dealing with similar emergencies in the future. In view of informal objections from several quarters, the United States apparently has decided not to press for such a force at this time. The only official action was Secretary Rusk's vaguely worded suggestion to the OAS regarding peacekeeping machinery.

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⁴⁴Dean Rusk, "The Common Quest for Freedom and Prosperity in the American Republics," Department of State Bulletin, Vol. LIII, 8 Nov. 1965, p. 994.

The most recent collective action taken against Communist subversion in Latin America was a resolution adopted by the OAS Council in response to actions taken at the January 1966 Tri-Continental Solidarity Conference of African, Asian and Latin American Communists. It denounced foreign support of subversive movements as a violation of the principle of non-intervention and a threat to the peace and security of the Western Hemisphere.⁴⁵

Out of the numerous events, statements, and political and economic efforts presented in this chapter there has evolved a position which represents the current United States policy toward Cuban subversion in Latin America. Under Secretary George W. Ball has set forth this policy succinctly by stating that the United States must proceed with two principal lines of strategy:

First, we must take all possible measure to strengthen the Latin American nations so that they may, through individual and collective means, resist Communist subversion. Second, we must employ all available instruments of power less than acts of war to limit or reduce the ability of the Cuban government to advance the Communist cause in Latin America through propaganda, sabotage, and subversion.⁴⁶

The first line of strategy the United States is implementing primarily, of course, through the Alliance for Progress. Other means are internal security programs and US encouragement of collective action by the OAS against subversion.

⁴⁵"OAS Condemns Havana Meeting," New York Times, 3 Feb. 1965, p. 4C.

⁴⁶George W. Ball, "US Policy Toward Cuba," Department of State Publication 7690, May 1964, p. 7.

The second line of strategy is being implemented, in the main, by the US program of economic denial, the objectives of which are:

First--and most important--to demonstrate to the peoples of the American Republics that communism has no future in the Western Hemisphere;

Second, to make plain to the people of Cuba and to elements of the power structure of the regime that the present regime cannot serve their interests;

Third, to reduce the will and ability of the present Cuban regime to export subversion and violence to the other American states;

Fourth, to increase the cost to the Soviet Union of maintaining a Communist outpost in the Western Hemisphere.⁴⁷

Finally, Secretary Ball made clear that US policy is directed against the Communist regime in Cuba, that the United States has no quarrel with the Cuban people, and that it looks forward to the day when the people of Cuba achieve freedom and democracy.⁴⁸

⁴⁷ Ibid., pp. 12-13.

⁴⁸ Ibid., pp. 21-22.

CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The foregoing chapters have traced the evolution of US policy toward Cuban subversion. This chapter analyzes this policy to determine whether it represents a sound and appropriate, and indeed the most effective, means of dealing with the threat. Specifically, this chapter assesses the results of US policy as reflected in the status of Cuba and Latin America today and the prospects of communism's gaining the upper hand in Latin America in the future. Next, it presents considerations of some of the alternate lines of US strategy which have been suggested from time to time to see whether they offer potential improvements over the present US policy. Finally, it deals with the question of whether there are any specific areas in which changes could be made in order that US policy may better meet its objectives.

CUBA AND LATIN AMERICA TODAY

When Fidel Castro first attained power in 1959, his popularity was at a peak in Latin America. He was hailed as the liberator of his people, a hope for the poor and the oppressed, and an example for the rest of the hemisphere. As one Latin American asks,

Who can be against a creed that reads: Distribute the land, give to the poor, educate the unlettered, care for the sick, share the wealth, make public

what is private, make the stranger's your own,
raise up the humble, and level the proud?"¹

In the early days of his regime he was widely applauded as a "David versus Goliath" who had stood up to the hated Yankee.²

In many circles US opposition to him was attributed to American dislike for reform and a desire to continue American economic exploitation of Cuba. Cuban propaganda, furthermore, helped convince many that the United States had forced Castro into Russia's arms by pressure and intimidation. Even later, when his aims toward subversion of the hemisphere were becoming increasingly clear, the US role in the Bay of Pigs fiasco evoked considerable sympathy for Castro.

Where does Cuba stand today? On the plus side, it must be noted that, after seven years, Castro still holds power in Cuba and shows little indication of relinquishing it. In recent months he has made significant strides in establishing himself as one of the key spokesmen in the world for Communist "wars of national liberation." His country is recognized as the base for training Latin Americans in subversion, propaganda, and violence. As a result of Cuba's massive propaganda effort, the terms "Castroism" and "fidelismo" are familiar even in many remote jungle and mountain areas of South and Central America. And finally, thanks to extensive Soviet military assistance, Cuba has built a powerful

¹Jaime Benitez, The US, Cuba, and Latin America, p. 5.

²David D. Burks, Cuba under Castro, p. 48.

military machine in the Western Hemisphere, surpassed only by those of the United States and, possibly, Canada.

On the other side of the coin, however, Castro's prestige in Latin America has been steadily declining. As his regime moved from leftist reform to Marxism-Leninism, as the danger of his threat to export his revolution throughout the hemisphere became apparent, as the number of refugees from his island began to mount into the hundreds of thousands, and as the US propaganda effort continued to point out the truth about his regime, enthusiasm for Castroism gradually waned. Probably the most severe blow to his image occurred during the October 1962 missile crisis, when scant attention was paid to him by either the Soviet Union or the United States.

Furthermore, an important indicator is the fact that, despite Castro's investment in propaganda, subversion, and violence beyond Cuba's borders, not one Latin American country has fallen under Communist control. In Venezuela, Castro provided training in subversive activity to more nationals from that country than any other in Latin America, supplied arms and equipment in large amounts, and directed a last-ditch terrorist effort to prevent voters from going to the polls. In view of this effort, the fact that Romulo Betancourt successfully completed his full five-year term and that the election of Raul Leoni, his successor, in December 1963, was conducted in an orderly manner, was a resounding victory for the democratic system.³

³US Congress, House, Subcommittee on Inter-American Affairs, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Report, Communism in Latin America, p. 2.

In Brazil, the Communist-influenced Goulart regime had brought the country to the brink of disaster, politically and economically, when, in April 1964, a military coup, backed by ten state governors, resulted in the election of a vigorous anti-Communist, General Humberto Castello Branco, as provisional president. Since then, the wild inflation has been brought under control and there are encouraging signs of greatly increased government stability.⁴

In the September 1964 elections in Chile, Eduardo Frei rolled up the largest plurality in that country's history against the Communist-backed candidate, and the March 1965 elections won his party an absolute majority in the Chamber of Deputies, the first such since 1851.⁵

In December 1964 in British Guiana the pro-Communist regime of Cheddi Jagan was defeated by popular vote and a new coalition government established.⁶

In the Dominican Republic revolution in April 1965, a Communist takeover was averted by President Johnson's prompt action in sending in troops and the OAS's solidarity in assisting in the cease-fire agreement and establishing an Inter-American Peace Force to keep the situation under control.

Finally, only one country in Latin America maintains diplomatic relations with Cuba today, and many countries have, since mid-1964, imposed severe sanctions against her.

⁴Ibid.

⁵Ibid.

⁶Ibid.

While it is difficult to evaluate the precise impact that US policy has had in achieving these results, there can be little doubt that US propaganda efforts, US diplomatic efforts to obtain greater solidarity in the Western Hemisphere, and US internal security programs have been instrumental.

As a result of the US economic denial program and generally good cooperation from US allies, Cuba has now become an economic as well as a political outcast of the West and is almost wholly dependent upon the Soviet Union for its economic existence. In the words of Edwin M. Martin, Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs, the Cuban economy has become a "shambles," which he credits to "monumental mismanagement" of the Cuban government as well as to Washington's policy of economic denial.⁷ Present-day Cuba is plagued with vastly decreased standards of living, rationing of many essential items, stagnation of industrial output, deterioration of industrial plant equipment, low labor productivity, shortage of essential labor and managerial skills, a substantial drop in sugar production and drastic decreases in exports.

By contrast, economic development in the remainder of Latin America, spurred on by the Alliance for Progress, is generally on the upswing. In an address on June 10, 1965,

⁷Edwin M. Martin, "Cuba, Latin America, and Communism," Department of State Bulletin, Vol. XLIX, 14 Oct. 1963, p. 576.

Secretary Rusk said that the gross national product growth rate for Latin America as a whole was 2½% per capita in 1964 and there were good prospects for a similar rate in 1965, which meets the target originally established at Punta del Este. Other achievements of the Alliance he cited as follows:

12 countries have land reform laws;

10 have produced national development plans or sector investment programs, and other country programs are being completed;

15 have self-help housing programs, and more than 300,000 dwelling units have been completed or are nearing completion;

every alliance country has improved its tax system or tax administration;

9 have undertaken major tax reform;

42 intermediate credit institutions have been created;

6,150 miles of roads have been built;

more than 75,000 teachers have been trained;

nearly 10 million schoolbooks have been circulated;

more than 13 million schoolchildren are participating in special school lunch programs, three times the number of 2½ years ago;

more than 200,000 agricultural credit loans have been made.⁸

There is still a great deal of criticism of the Alliance, to be sure. The main objection seems to be that the money does not find its way to the target, the 80% who are poor and are continuing

⁸Dean Rusk, "The Alliance for Progress: A Partnership of Mutual Help," Department of State Bulletin, Vol. LIII, 5 Jul. 1965, p. 3.

to get poorer, because the wealthy oligarchy block the land and tax reforms that are so essential for effective progress. Another is that, although laws to reform taxation and land distribution have been enacted in order to qualify for financial help under the Alliance, there is no guarantee that these laws will ever be applied.⁹

Such criticism is in many cases warranted and difficult to refute. However, until something better can be devised, the United States should do the best that it can with the existing program. The Alliance is aimed at deep-rooted problems, some of which have existed for several centuries, and it must be recognized that miracles cannot be accomplished and the problems overcome in a decade or two. One needs only to look at the long and difficult social problem of the American Negro to realize that social change is not easily accomplished. On the brighter side, though, certainly very few people envisioned that the Marshall Plan would meet with such quick and complete success in bringing about the economic recovery of Western Europe. The Alliance faces different problems, of course, but there is no reason to be unduly pessimistic.

ANALYSIS OF ALTERNATE POLICIES

Critics of US policy toward Cuban subversion may be classified into three general categories: at one extreme are those who favor a "hard line," at the other those who propose a "soft line,"

⁹Frank J. Moreno, "The Fear Within," The Yale Review, Winter 1966, p. 164.

and somewhere in between are those who agree with the present administration position, which might be referred to as "hostile coexistence."¹⁰

Advocates of the hard line favor ousting Castro and communism from Cuba by whatever means are required. Although they would prefer to accomplish this goal peacefully through the OAS or by means short of military intervention, they are willing, if need be, to take more stringent measures. One group has advocated that the United States employ the concept of a "Declaration of Contraband," which would involve visit and search of vessels anywhere on the high seas for materials of war. One technicality is that the United States would also have to declare that a state of belligerency exists with Cuba. Such a concept, this group contends, would be more peaceful in nature than a blockade, since it would not operate within sovereign territory of any country. Other groups favor a genuine blockade, in which the United States would patrol Cuban coastal waters and prevent any ship from reaching Cuban ports.¹¹

Such a course of action would be ill-advised. First of all, there is little difference between the "Declaration of Contraband" and the blockade. Certainly, either measure would evoke considerable reaction from other nations, particularly the more powerful

¹⁰ Burks, op. cit., p. 61.

¹¹ American Security Council, National Strategy Committee, "Communist Control of Cuba: A Serious Threat to National Security," ASC Washington Report, Aug. 1961, p. 14.

US allies. It would, perhaps, provide the spark that could set off a military confrontation with the Soviet Union, who would undoubtedly consider it a serious affront to its prestige. And further, it would involve the employment of ships and crews, and expenditure of funds, far out of proportion to the desired goals.

Next in degree of severity are those who favor US support of raids and uprisings by dissident elements within Cuba.¹² Senator Thomas J. Dodd, one of this group, points out that uprisings, demonstrations, and antigovernment guerrilla activities in Cuba are on the increase.¹³ Such measures, while they have merit, are difficult to execute from the standpoint of timing and coordination, particularly when the United States cannot communicate directly with those on the ground in Cuba because of the break in diplomatic relations. Also, much of the available evidence indicates that through his program of ruthless suppression, Castro has managed to get a firm grip on the populace.

Other hard line advocates have proposed that the United States organize, equip, and train a Cuban army in exile on American soil, much as occurred in the abortive Bay of Pigs invasion, but profiting from the lessons learned in that fiasco.¹⁴ Senator Barry Goldwater went even further by proposing that this army be transferred to

¹²Foreign Policy Association, Inc., Great Decisions 1964, p. 58.

¹³Thomas J. Dodd, "Vietnam and Latin America," Congressional Record, Vol. 111, No. 160, 31 Aug. 1965, p. 21521

¹⁴Burks, op. cit., p. 59.

The US naval base at Guantanamo Bay, that the United States then recognize it as the legitimate government of Cuba, and that the army proceed from that point to take control of the whole country.¹⁵ Such measures would do much to hamper US efforts in Latin America by raising the bugbear of intervention once again and would damage the US image throughout the world.

Finally, there are a few hard line advocates who feel that the United States should openly invade Cuba or send troops in under the guise of aiding an internal uprising.¹⁶ In addition to the objections mentioned in the paragraph above, there is a possibility that the Soviet Union will refuse to relinquish its foot in the door and will do its utmost to prevent the success of such action either by direct military action or by igniting a brush fire somewhere else in the world. Or, as one observer ventures, it might give Russia the opportunity to retreat from Cuba gracefully, meanwhile realizing a sizeable propaganda advantage.¹⁷

Soft line advocates argue that, rather than to press for Castro's ouster from Cuba, the United States should, instead, try to wean him from the Communist bloc and urge him to abandon the exportation of his revolution.¹⁸ Since the Soviet missiles have been removed, according to Senator Fulbright, "Castro is a nuisance but not a grave threat to the United States, . . . and he cannot

¹⁵ Barry Goldwater, as quoted in Foreign Policy Association, Inc., Great Decisions 1964, p. 58.

¹⁶ Foreign Policy Association, Inc., op. cit., p. 58.

¹⁷ John N. Plank, "Monroe's Doctrine--and Castro's," New York Times Magazine, 7 Oct. 1962, p. 30.

¹⁸ Burks, op. cit., p. 61.

be gotten rid of except by means that are wholly disproportionate to the objective."¹⁹ If the United States relieved the pressure somewhat on Castro, these advocates believe, he might be encouraged to become another Tito. Certainly it would be to his advantage economically to be more conciliatory toward the United States.

While Castro conceivably could drift away from the Soviet bloc and pursue a more nationalistic course, it is highly unlikely that he could be persuaded to abandon his grandiose schemes for subversion of the hemisphere, at least, not for the foreseeable future. To follow the course proposed by the soft line advocates, then, would result in strengthening Castro at home, in Latin America, and in the rest of the world, without any noticeable advantage to the United States.

CONCLUSION

The policy being pursued by the United States today generally represents a sound and effective plan for curbing the threat of Cuban subversion and of ultimately eliminating it from the Western Hemisphere. These goals can be achieved by the lines of strategy currently being implemented, with minimal risk of major military confrontation. The United States must not permit itself to become complacent over the threat nor satisfied with less than full realization, ultimately, of its goals. Yet, it must be

¹⁹J. W. Fulbright, Old Myths and New Realities, p. 33.

patient with a reasonable rate of progress, must expect setbacks, and must be prepared to deal with them decisively.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Three recommendations are offered, based on the foregoing analysis and conclusion. Action recommended would, if carried out, facilitate implementation of US policy and realization of US goals.

The first concerns early detection of incipient insurgency. To paraphrase the old saw about the ounce of prevention, "Early detection and prompt corrective action prevent wars." It is recommended, therefore, that within each Latin American country, all elements of the US country team be cognizant of, and alert for, specific indicators that violence and subversion within the country are beginning to outstrip the local government's capability to cope with them. Examples of such indicators are:

. . . Signs of breakdown in law and order, such as inability to collect taxes; . . . to protect supporters of the government, such as village headmen or police chiefs; . . . the appearance of . . . strong-arm squads or even personal or party armies . . .

. . . Support of dissident elements from the world leftist press, sympathy demonstrations in communist and nonaligned capitals, and the appearance of petitioners or would-be representatives at the United Nations . . .

Change of peaceful demonstrations, picketings, and sit-downs . . . into mob action and violence . . .

. . . A wave of total terror, including . . . indiscriminate bombings and machine-gunning . . .

. . . Kidnapping for international leverage . . . i.e./ if someone is kidnapped in one country and his death is

threatened unless a prisoner is released in another country . . .²⁰

Should such indicators appear, the country team should urge the local government to take such steps or make such requests for help as may be necessary, at an early enough date to permit maximum effectiveness. Should materiel or assistance from the United States be required, the country team should alert Washington that such a request is forthcoming, in order that the request may be fulfilled expeditiously.

The second recommendation is that the United States renew and intensify its efforts for establishment of a permanent OAS peace force, together with the necessary peacekeeping machinery to provide for its prompt and effective utilization in cases of emergency. Of particular concern is the ability of the United States to deal effectively with an outbreak of several simultaneous Communist-inspired revolutions. Furthermore, such a peace force would preclude the charges of imperialistic intervention against the United States and would give Latin America a sense of regional pride and solidarity not hitherto experienced. It must be cautioned, however, that before such a force is committed, the situation is known to be caused by Communist-inspired insurgency and is not a true social revolution. On the other hand, even in case of a true social revolution, the force should be poised and ready

²⁰Richard H. Sanger, "Life Cycle of a Typical Revolt," Transition (No. 3), Apr. 1965, pp. 46-50.

for commitment in the event Communist elements seek to exploit the disorder and attain control.

Finally, the United States should prepare now a plan of action to be implemented in case Castro should be overthrown or in the unlikely event that he should renounce his affinity with communism. Such a plan should include provisions for immediate economic aid and technical assistance. Certain features of the plan might very well be publicized as promises to the Cuban people, in an effort to implement the statement made by our Department of State:

The United States, along with the other nations of the hemisphere, expresses a profound determination to assure future democratic governments in Cuba full and positive support in their efforts to help the Cuban people achieve freedom, democracy, and social justice Because the Castro regime has become the spearhead of attack on the inter-American system, that regime represents a fateful challenge to the inter-American system. For freedom is the common destiny of our hemisphere--freedom from domestic tyranny and foreign intervention, from hunger and poverty and illiteracy, freedom for each person and nation in America to realize the high potentialities of life in the twentieth century.²¹



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²¹US Department of State, Cuba, Publication 7171, Apr. 1961, pp. 35-36.

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